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Abstract 
The first result in this paper says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation 
there is a balanced vector of transfers so that the resulting allocation is fair. The 
second result here says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a 
pricing function defined on consumption bundles and a balanced vector of transfers 
so that they together form a non-linear market equilibrium. The first result is used to 
establish the second. Subsequently we prove the existence of egalitarian equivalent 
solutions for package assignment problems and shows that they satisfy the “fair share 
guaranteed” property. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This paper is based on two earlier papers entitled: (a) Envy-free solutions and 
Non-linear equilibrium for the Package Assignment Problem; (b) The Egalitarian 
Equivalent Solution for Package Assignment Problems. 
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Introduction: Fair (or equitable) division of a given amount of resources among a     
finite number of agents, has concerned humankind since time immemorial. The body 
of economic literature that is available on the problem is voluminous, though of 
considerably recent vintage. The compulsions of “being fair” go beyond morality. It 
has a lot more to do with the prescribed resource allocation being acceptable and self-
enforcing for the beneficiaries. Fair division of workload facilitates voluntary 
compliance by the employees. Equitable division of infrastructure and other facilities 
reduce tension at work. In society egalitarian distribution of wealth among the people 
is meant to prevent friction and instability. In recent times fair division solutions have 
been applied to resource allocation problems in e-commerce. 
There is one model of fair division concerned with an infinitely divisible but 
heterogeneous resource that goes by the name of cake-cutting problems. A good 
exposition of issues related to cake cutting problems can be found in Robertson and 
Webb (1998). When the resources are infinitely divisible and homogeneous, the 
concept of equity that was initially proposed is known as “envy-freeness” by Foley 
(1967). Rigorous analysis of the concept of envy-freeness begins with the work of 
Varian (1974). There are many good surveys on this topic including ones that study 
algorithms/procedures that implement envy-free solutions. A third model of fair 
division concerns resources that are indivisible and money. The worth of each 
resource is measured in units of money and the latter is also used for making side-
payments or transfers to the agents. Each agent values a bundle of resource differently 
and this value is measured by the maximum that the agent is willing to pay for the 
resource. One of the earliest expositions of this model is due to Alkan, Demange and 
Gale (1991), where there is only one unit of each indivisible resource available for 
distribution and each agent can consume at most one unit of it. Such a situation is 
variously referred to as an assignment problem/ game or permutation game in the 
literature. Alkan et al (1991) showed that in such models there always exists an envy-
free allocation and that all envy-free allocations are efficient, i.e. maximizes 
aggregate willingness to pay. Allocations that are both envy-free and efficient are 
called fair. While this existence property is a much cited result, what the paper really 
accomplishes is to show that for assignment problems the theory of efficient and 
envy-free allocations is no different from the equilibrium theory that was developed 
for such problems by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957). Since the appearance of the 
paper by Alkan et al. a large number of proofs have been offered for the existence of 
market equilibrium and (or what is essentially the same thing) fair allocations for 
assignment problems, including one by Lahiri (2007). 
The next level of generalization involves the fair division of one or more than one 
type of indivisible good(s) for each of which one or more than one unit is available. 
Further we do not assume any restriction on the number of units or types of goods 
that an agent can consume. Once again money is used as a measure of value as well 
as a unit of payment. A typical agent now has a willingness to pay for a bundle of 
resources, rather than a single unit of one. Thus complementarities in preferences for 
goods as well as scale effects may be present. Such a model is what we (following 
Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2001)) refer to here as a package assignment problem.         
One of the major concerns of the package assignment problem is the existence of  
market equilibrium, where the price per unit of consumption of any commodity is 
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independent of the consumption bundle. There are many examples of package 
assignment problems, both simple and meaningful, for which market equilibrium 
does not exist. A very important sub-class of package assignment problems is the so-
called “combinatorial allocation problem”. Fair allocations for combinatorial 
allocation problems and the fact that they do not satisfy most properties suugested for 
such problems have been discussed in Bevia (1998). In a combinatorial allocation 
problem there is exactly one unit of each indivisible object that is available for 
distribution. Keslo and Crawford (1982) postulate a gross substitutability condition 
that is sufficient for the existence of market equilibrium in combinatorial allocation 
problems. Gul and Stacchetti (1997) show that if individual willingness to pay 
functions exhibit a no-complementarities condition, then again a market equilibrium 
exists for the same class of problems. Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997) show that the 
aggregate willingness to pay for the combinatorial allocation problem coincides with 
the optimal value of the corresponding relaxed problem if and only if there is a 
market equilibrium. This result can be extended to the entire domain of package 
assignment problems. More recently, Lahiri (2006) shows that a market equilibrium 
for a package assignment problem exists if and only if the aggregate willingness to 
pay function is “locally concave” at the initial endowment.    
Given the distinct possibility of market equilibrium not existing, the question that was 
posed by Wurman and Wellman (undated) was whether there is an equilibrium for 
which instead of a fixed unit price for each commodity there was a price associated 
with each consumption bundle. The answer to this question was in the affirmative. 
Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) show that given any feasible non-monetary 
allocation that maximizes the aggregate willingness to pay, i.e. an efficient non-
monetary allocation, there are pricing functions one for each agent that is compatible 
with each agent rationally choosing the consumption bundle assigned to it by the non-
monetary allocation. 
Issues concerning equitable allocations in a package assignment problem have rarely 
been raised, since it was realized that the theory of fair allocations is substantially 
similar to the equilibrium theory. In Moulin (1995) can be found a remarkable result 
that obtains the existence of fair allocations for package assignment problems as a 
corollary of the corresponding existence result for assignment problems. However the 
proof that is available in Moulin (1995) states something much stronger: given any 
efficient non-monetary allocation there is a vector of transfers, so that the resulting 
allocation is fair. Since in a package assignment problem an efficient non-monetary 
allocation always exists the stated result in Moulin (1995) follows from this other 
stronger result (also due to Moulin (1995)) that we present here as Proposition 1. 
Using Proposition 1 it is easy to show that given any efficient non-monetary 
allocation there is pricing function defined on consumption bundles (and common to 
all agents) that is compatible with each agent rationally choosing the consumption 
bundle assigned to it by the non-monetary allocation. This is the second result of this 
note. 
Proposition 1 was definitely known and Proposition 2 can be easily recognized. 
Hence the only token contribution that the presentation of the first two results make is 
to put in writing a proof of Proposition 2 (which as stated is stronger than the 
corresponding one in Wurman and Wellman (undated)) using Proposition 1. 
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In the context of division of infinitely divisible and homogeneous resources, it often 
happens that envy free allocations may often lead to inequitable distribution of 
surplus. For instance as shown in Moulin (1995), in any two agent fair division 
problem with one agent having linear and strictly increasing indifference curves and 
the other having Cobb-Douglas preferences, at the market equilibrium from equal 
division the agent with linear indifference curves is exactly as well off as she would 
be under equal split, where as the other agent may ascend to a higher level of 
satisfaction. Since market equilibrium from equal division is fair, this in-egalitarian 
distribution of surplus above equal division does little credit to the concept of envy 
freeness. An alternative solution concept by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978), often 
remedies such inequities. The solution due to Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) is known 
as the egalitarian equivalent solution and it captures the idea of giving “equal” shares 
of the surplus above equal splits. In this solution, an agent’s surplus at an allocation is 
measured by the fraction of the total resource that she views as just equivalent to the 
given allocation. An egalitarian equivalent allocation is one where this fraction is the 
same for all agents. An egalitarian equivalent solution due to Pazner and Schmeidler 
(1978) is a feasible egalitarian equivalent allocation whose corresponding fraction is 
the largest among all feasible egalitarian equivalent allocations.  
This paper has similar concerns but (once again) in the context of package assignment 
problems. At the outset it needs to be realized that talking about fractions of the total 
resource is meaningless when the resource is indivisible. We do not have the facility 
of convexity that the original model enjoyed. Hence we measure the surplus of an 
agent at an allocation by the fraction of her willingness to pay for the total resource 
that is equal to the monetary worth of her consumption at the allocation. An 
egalitarian equivalent allocation is one for which this fraction is the same for all 
agents. We call this common fraction the egalitarian equivalence factor (of the 
allocation). An egalitarian equivalent allocation as defined here is a generalization of 
an equitable allocation due to Brams and Taylor (1996). An egalitarian equivalent 
solution is a feasible egalitarian equivalent allocation whose egalitarian equivalence 
factor maximizes the egalitarian equivalence factor among all such allocations (i.e. 
among all feasible egalitarian equivalent allocations). Our first result shows that an 
egalitarian equivalent solution exists and it is efficient. 
It may be conjectured that the proof of this result would be identical to the proof of 
the corresponding result due to Pazner and Schmeidler (1978). That this is not the 
case follows from the fact that due to indivisibilities we are prevented from making 
arbitrarily small transfers of non-monetary commodities among the agents. Further, 
there is no natural bound on the possible monetary transfers we can make among the 
agents. The two proofs are analogous but materially different. 
The final result of this paper shows that the egalitarian solution satisfies what we may 
refer to as “fair share guaranteed” property. In the divisible good context it is also 
known as individual rationality fro equal division. Moulin (1995) contains a 
discussion of this property including its definitions for assignment problems. The first 
question that arises is: How do we define it for package assignment problems? 
We attempt an answer along the following lines. What would a typical agent ‘i’ 
consider as an equal division of the total resources? It seems reasonable that equal 
division of her willingness to pay for the total resource is a good candidate. Accepting 
 5 
this as our benchmark, we propose that any reasonable solution to a fair division 
problem should allocate each agent at least what she perceives to be an equal division 
of the total resource. We call this property “fair share guaranteed” and show that the 
egalitarian equivalent solution satisfies this property. In the fair division literature, 
“fair share guaranteed” is also known as “proportionality” (see Brams and Taylor 
(1996) for instance). The egalitarian equivalent solution thus shares with several 
others a property that is desirable for equitable distribution of resources. 
This paper is an attempt to extend received theory of distributive justice to the domain 
of package assignment problems. There is far too much about this domain that is 
already known to suggest that its structure is remarkably different from distribution 
problems with homogeneous and divisible commodities. At the same time there is not 
enough known about several conventional solution concepts that have been defined in 
the context of fair allocation of divisible goods. This is precisely what makes this 
paper possible.       
       
      The Model: Let Z+ = א∪{0}, where א denotes the set of natural numbers. Let there be 
H > 0 agents and L+1 > 1 commodities, the last one of which is money. The first L 
commodities are non-monetary consumption goods. Money is both consumed as well 
as used as a measure of worth/value. Let w∈ LZ +  denote the aggregate initial 
endowment of the non-monetary goods which is available for distribution among the 
agents.  
For j = 1,…,L, let wj denote the aggregate amount of commodity j that is initially 
available in the economy. 
We shall refer to elements of LZ + as non-monetary consumption vectors/bundles. 
For i = 1,…,H, let fi: LZ + →ℜ+ with fi(0) = 0 be the willingness to pay function of 
agent i. Thus for a non-monetary consumption vector x, fi(x) denotes the maximum 
amount of money that agent i is willing to pay for x. We assume that fi is non-
decreasing, i.e. for x,y∈ LZ + : [x ≥ y] implies [ fi(x) ≥ fi(y)]. 
The above framework has been known in the literature variously as multi-unit 
assignment (or auction) and package assignment problems. 
It is often represented as the pair <{fi/i= 1,…,H}, w>. 
Let e denote the vector in ℜL all whose coordinates are equal to one and for j = 
1,…,L, let ej denote the vector in ℜL whose jth coordinate is equal to one and all other 
coordinates are equal to zero.  
 
For x∈ LZ + , let C(x) = {y∈ZL/ y ≤ x}. 
A non-monetary consumption vector of agent i is denoted by a vector zi ∈ LZ + . 
A non-monetary allocation is an array z = <zi/ i = 1,…,H> such that for all i = 1,…,H: 
z
i
 is a non-monetary consumption vector for agent i. 
Given x∈ LZ + , let F(x) = { z = <zi/ i = 1,…,H>/ z is a non-monetary allocation 
satisfying ∑
=
H
i
iz
1
≤ x}. A non-monetary allocation z is said to be feasible if z∈F(w). 
An allocation is a pair (z,t) such that z is a non-monetary allocation and t∈ℜH denotes 
a vector of transfers to the agents. 
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An allocation (z,t) is said to be feasible if z is a non-monetary feasible allocation and t 
is a balanced vector of transfers, i.e. ∑
=
H
i
it
1
= 0. 
The function V: LZ + →ℜ+ such that for all x∈ LZ + : V(x) = Max{∑
=
H
i
ii zf
1
)( / z = <zi/ i = 
1,…,H>∈F(x)}, is called the maximum value function.  
Since we have assumed that for all i = 1,…,H, fi is non-decreasing, it must be the case 
that V is non-decreasing as well (i.e. for all x,y∈ZL:[x ≥ y] implies [V(x) ≥ V(y)]).  
A feasible non-monetary allocation z  = <zi/i = 1,…,H> is said to be efficient if  
∑
=
H
i
ii zf
1
)( = V(w). 
A feasible allocation (z,t) is said to be efficient if z is an efficient non-monetary 
allocation.  
A feasible allocation (z,t) is said to be envy free if for all i, k = 1,…,H: fi(zi) + ti ≥ 
fi(zk) + tk. 
Thus if (z,t) is envy free then for all i,k = 1,…,H: (a) fi(zi) – fi(zk) ≥ tk – ti; (b) fk(zk) – 
fk(zi) ≥ ti – tk. Thus, (z,t) is envy free implies that there is a real number τ(z) (i.e. 
possibly depending on z) such that for all i = 1,…,H: |ti| ≤τ(z). 
Since for a package assignment problem the number of non-monetary allocations is 
finite, we get the following observation.   
There exists a real number τ such that if (z,t) is envy free then: |ti| ≤τ. 
A price vector p is an element of L+ℜ \{0}, where for j = 1,…,L, pj denotes the price of 
input j. 
A pair (p*, (z*, t*)) where p* is a price vector and (z*, t*) is a feasible allocation is said 
to be a Market Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (MEEI) if for all i = 1,…,H: 
(i) iz* solves: 
Maximize [fi(x) – p*Tx] 
subject to x ∈C(w); 
(ii) ti = 
H
1 p*Tw – p*Tzi. 
A feasible allocation (z*, t*) is said to be an MEEI allocation if there exists a price 
vector p* such that (p*, (z*, t*)) is a MEEI. 
It is well-known that if L > 1 then no market equilibrium, let alone one from equal 
incomes need exist for a package assignment problem. If L = 1, then a MEEI exists 
under very reasonable assumptions on the willingness to pay functions of the agents. 
However if a package assignment problem admits an MEEI allocation then (as may 
be easily verified) such an allocation would be both envy-free and efficient. 
An allocation (z,t) that is both envy-free and efficient is said to be fair.   
The non-existence of MEEI allocations for package assignment problems means that 
a certain desirable type of fair allocation(s) cannot be guaranteed in our framework.  
 
Fair Allocations: It is well known that if there is just one unit of every commodity 
that is initially available and each agent can consume at most one commodity at a 
time, then a fair allocation always exists. Moulin (1995) (Corollary to Theorem 4.1) 
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uses this result to elegantly establish that for package assignment problems a fair 
allocation always exists. In fact the result that Moulin uses to prove the corollary 
permits the following stronger version of the existence result a proof of which (due to 
Aragones (1992)) is being provided for completeness.  
 
Proposition 1: Let z* be an efficient non-monetary allocation for a package 
assignment problem. Then there exists a balanced vector of transfers t* such that (z*, 
t*) is a fair allocation. Since in a package assignment problem an efficient non-
monetary allocation always exists, so does a fair allocation. 
  
Proof: Let z* be an efficient non-monetary allocation for the given package 
assignment problem. Let σ: {1,…,H}→ C(w) be defined thus: σ(i) = z*i for i = 
1,…,H.  
For i, j ∈{1,…,H}, let qij = fi(σ(i)) – fi(σ(j)). 
For i∈{1,…,H}, let ri =  
min{∑
=
==∈
−
k
t
tii iiandktforHinumbernaturalaiskq tt
1
0,...,0},...,1{,/1 }. 
In the above for it∈{1,…,H}, repetitions are allowed, although as we shall see, that 
the minimum is attained when there are no repetitions. 
Suppose < iiandnumbernaturalaiskwherektforHiq tii tt ==∈− 0)(,...,0},...,1{/1 > is 
a finite sequence. 
Suppose <ij, ij+1,…, is-1, is> is a subsequence of consecutive elements from <io,…,ik> 
such that ij = is, other terms being distinct, i.e. is a minimal cycle. 
Let σ0: {1,…,H}→ C(w) be such that σ0|{1,…,H}\{ij,…,is} = σ|{1,…,H}\{ij,…,is} 
and σ0(it) = σ(it+1) for t∈{j,…, s-1}. 
Since σ is efficient, ∑
=
H
i
i if
1
))((σ - ∑
=
H
i
i if
1
0 ))((σ ≥ 0.  
Thus ∑
−
=
+
1
1
s
jt
ii tt
q ≥ 0. 
Thus ∑
−
=
+
1
0
1
k
t
ii tt
q ≥ ∑
−
=
+
1
0
1
k
t
ii tt
q - ∑
−
=
+
1
1
s
jt
ii tt
q ≥ ri. 
Hence for the purpose of calculating ri, there will be no difference if we considered 
the sequence < ksjtforHiq tii tt ,...,1,,...,0},...,1{/1 +=∈− > instead of the original 
sequence.  
Hence for the purpose of calculating ri we can omit all cycles from a sequence and 
consider sequences of distinct indices and the one element sequence {qii}. 
Since the number of such sequences is finite it must be the case that ri > -∞. Since qii 
= 0, ri ≤ 0.   
Consider the vector of transfers t*, where *it  = ∑
=
H
k
krH 1
1
-ri. 
It is balanced, i.e.∑
=
H
i
it
1
*
= 0. 
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Let us show now that for all i,k∈{1,…,H}: fi(σ(i))+t*i ≥ fi(σ(k))+t*k. 
Let rk =  ∑
−
=
+
1
0
1
K
t
ii tt
q , where io = k. 
Then [fi(σ(i))+t*i] – [fi(σ(k))+t*k] = [fi(σ(i))-fi(σ(k))] + [t*i- t*k] = qik + rk – ri = qik + 
∑
−
=
+
1
0
1
K
t
ii tt
q -ri ≥ 0. 
Thus (z*, t*) is envy-free. Since z* is efficient it follows that (z*, t*) is fair. Q.E.D. 
 
The following observation concerning envy-free allocations for a package assignment 
problem is noteworthy. 
 
Claim 1: An allocation (z*, t*) is envy free if and only if for all (coalitions) S,T ⊂ 
{1,…,H} with S, T ≠ φ: ∑
∈
+
Si
iii tzf ])([ ** ≥ ∑ ∑
∈ ∈
+
Si Tk
kki tzf
T
}])([||
1{ ** . 
Proof: Suppose that for all (coalitions) S,T ⊂ {1,…,H} with S, T ≠ φ: 
∑
∈
+
Si
iii tzf ])([ ** ≥ ∑ ∑
∈ ∈
+
Si Tk
kki tzf
T
}])([||
1{ ** . 
Then taking |S| = |T| = 1 it follows that (z*,t*) is envy free. 
Now suppose that (z*, t*) is envy-free. Let S,T ⊂ {1,…,H} with S, T ≠ φ. 
Thus for all i∈S and k∈T: fi(z*i) + t*i ≥ fi(z*k) + t*k. Taking the sum over all k∈T and 
dividing by |T| we get fi(z*i) + t*i ≥ ])([||
1 ** k
Tk
ki tzf
T
+∑
∈
for all i∈S. 
The desired inequality in Claim 1 follows by taking the sum of the last inequalities 
over i∈S. Q.E.D. 
 
Non-Linear Market Equilibrium: A non-linear price function, or simply a pricing 
function(to put it briefly) is a function P:C(w)→ℜ+ such for x∈C(w), P(x) is the price 
of the non-monetary consumption bundle x. 
Faced with a pricing function P, an agent chooses a consumption bundle in C(w) that 
maximizes his willingness to pay minus the price of the bundle. 
A pair (P, (z*, t*)) where P is a pricing function and (z*, t*) an efficient allocation is 
said to be a Non-linear Market Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (NMEEI) if for all i 
= 1,…,H: 
(i) fi(z*i) – P(z*i) ≥ fi(x) – P(x) for all x∈C(w); 
(ii) t*i = 
H
zP
H
k
k
∑
=1
* )(
- P(z*i). 
In a recent paper by Wellman and Wurman (undated), it has been claimed that in 
every package assignment problem, where there is exactly one unit of each good 
available, a non-linear market equilibrium exists. In view of Proposition 1 we are able 
to establish a stronger result that says, given any efficient non-monetary allocation, 
we can find a pricing function and a corresponding balanced vector of transfers, in 
conformity with the requirements of a NMEEI. 
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Proposition 2: Let z* be an efficient non-monetary allocation for a given package 
assignment problem. (i)Then there exists a pricing function P and a balanced vector 
of transfers t* such that ((z*, t*), P) is a NMEEI. (ii) If there exists a pricing function P 
and a balanced vector of transfers t* such that ((z*, t*), P) is a NMEEI, then (z*, t*) is 
an envy-free allocation.   
 
Proof: Let z* be as in the statement of the theorem.  
(i) By Proposition 1, there exists a balanced vector of transfers t* such that (z*, t*) is a 
fair allocation. 
Let t0 = max{t*i/ i∈{1,…,H}}. Clearly t0 ≥ 0. Define P: C(w)→ℜ+ as follows: (a) 
P(z*i) = t0 – t*i; (b) P(x) = max{max {fi(x) – fi(z*i)+ P*(z*i)/ i = 1,…,H}, 0} if 
x∈C(w)\{z*i/ i = 1,…,H}. 
First let us verify that P is well-defined, i.e. if z*i = z*k, then P(z*i) = P(z*k). This 
follows from the fact that (z*, t*) is envy free, so that fi(z*i) + t*i ≥ fi(z*k) + t*k, fk(z*k) + 
t*k ≥ fk(z*i) + t*i and z*i = z*k together imply t*i = t*k and thus P(z*i) = P(z*k). 
Now (z*, t*) is envy free, for all i, k = 1,…,H: fi(z*i) – P(z*i) = fi(z*i) + t*i – t0 ≥ fi(z*k) 
+ t*k – t0 = fi(z*k) – P(z*k). 
Suppose x∈ C(w)\{z*i/ i = 1,…,H}. Thus for i = 1,…,H: P(x) ≥ fi(x) – fi(z*i) + P(z*i) 
implies fi(z*i) – P(z*i) ≥ fi(x) – P(x) for all x∈C(w)\{z*k/ k = 1,…,H}. 
Thus, fi(z*i) – P(z*i) ≥ fi(x) – P(x) for all x∈C(w). 
Finally, P(z*i) = t0 – t*i for all i = 1,…,H and t* is a balanced vector of transfers 
implies that t0 = 
H
zP
H
k
k
∑
=1
* )(
. 
Hence t*i = 
H
zP
H
k
k
∑
=1
* )(
- P(z*i) for all i = 1,…,H.  
This proves(i). 
The proof of (ii) is immediate. Q.E.D.    
      
Note: (a) The above proof is along the lines of the proof of Theorem 4.1(iii) in 
Moulin (1995). Our result extends the result in Moulin to a larger domain of 
assignment problems. The pricing function defined in the proof of Proposition 2, 
resembles the one defined in the proof of the corresponding result in Wurman and 
Wellman (undated). 
(b)Unlike Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) our pricing function in a non-linear 
market equilibrium does not discriminate between agents. 
 
Egalitarian Equivalent Solutions: An allocation (z,t) is said to be egalitarian 
equivalent if there exists λ ≥ 0 such that for all i = 1,…,n: ti + fi(zi) = λfi(w). 
The real number λ is said to be the egalitarian equivalence factor for (z,t). 
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A feasible allocation (z*,t*) is said to be an egalitarian equivalent solution if whenever 
(z,t) is a feasible egalitarian equivalent allocation whose egalitarian equivalence 
factor is λ, then λ* ≥ λ, where λ* is the egalitarian equivalence factor for (z*, t*). 
 
Thus (z*, t*) is an egalitarian equivalent solution if it is feasible, egalitarian equivalent 
and its egalitarian equivalence factor exceeds that of any other egalitarian equivalent 
allocation. 
 
Proposition 3: Given any package assignment problem, we can always find an 
egalitarian equivalent solution for it. Further, such a solution is always efficient. 
 
Proof: Suppose (z,t) is an egalitarian equivalent allocation and suppose its egalitarian 
equivalence factor exceeds one. If (z,t) were feasible, then we would get ∑
=
H
i
ii zf
1
)( > 
∑
=
H
i
i wf
1
)( implying fi(zi) > fi(w) for at least one i∈{1,…,H}. Since all the willingness 
to pay functions have been assumed to be weakly increasing, there exists at least one 
i∈{1,…,H} such that it is not the case that zi ≤ w. This contradicts feasibility of (z,t). 
Hence if the egalitarian equivalence factor exceeds one, then the corresponding 
allocation cannot be feasible. 
Let I = {λ∈[0,1]/ there exists a feasible allocation (z,t) with fi(w) ≥ ti + fi(zi) ≥ λfi(w) 
for i = 1,…,H}. 
Since 0∈I( the allocation where no transfer takes place and no one gets anything has 
egalitarian equivalence factor zero), I is non-empty. 
Let <λk/ k∈ℵ> be a sequence in I with 
∞→k
lim λk = λ. Let <(z(k), t(k))/ k∈ℵ> be a 
sequence of feasible allocations such that for all i = 1,…,H and k∈ℵ: t(k)i + fi(z(k)i) ≥ 
λ(k)fi(w). Since 
∞→k
lim λk = λ, there exists a real number M such that for all i = 1,…,H 
and k∈ℵ: max {fi(w)/ i = 1,…,H}≥ t(k)i + fi(z(k)i) ≥ M. Thus <t(k)/ k∈ℵ> must be a 
bounded sequence. Hence it admits a convergent subsequence. Further since the 
number of feasible non-monetary allocations are finite, there exists a non-monetary 
allocation z which repeats itself infinitely often in <z(k)/ k∈ℵ>. Thus there exists a 
subsequence of <(z(k), t(k))/ k∈ℵ> which converges to a feasible allocation (z,t). 
Clearly, fi(w) ≥ ti + fi(zi) ≥ λfi(w) for i = 1,…,H. Thus I is closed. 
Let λ* = sup{λ∈I}. Thus λ*∈I. 
Hence there exists a feasible allocation (z*, t*) such that fi(w) ≥ t*i + fi(z*i) ≥ λ*fi(w) 
for i = 1,…,H. 
Towards a contradiction suppose t*i + fi(z*i) > λ*fi(w) for some i. Thus λ* < 1. Let I+ = 
{i/ t*i + fi(z*i) > λ*fi(w)}. Clearly I+ is non-empty. If I+ = I, then it is possible to find λ 
> λ* such that λ∈I, contradicting the maximality of λ*. Thus I \ I+ is non-empty. Let ε 
> 0 be such that t*i + fi(z*i) > t*i + fi(z*i)- || +I
ε
 >  λ*fi(w) for all i∈I+. Thus, t*i + 
fi(z*i)+ |\| +II
ε
 >  λ*fi(w) for all i∈I\I+. Let t be the balanced vector of transfers 
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where ti = t*i - || +I
ε
 for all i∈I+ and ti = t*i + |\| +II
ε
 for all i∈I\I+. (z*, t) is feasible 
and there exists λ > λ* such that fi(w) ≥ ti + fi(z*i) ≥ λfi(w) for i = 1,…,H. This again 
contradicts the maximality of λ*. Thus, fi(w) ≥ t*i + fi(z*i) = λ*fi(w) for i = 1,…,H. 
Now suppose (z*, t*) is not efficient. Thus there exists a feasible non-monetary 
allocation z such that ∑
=
H
i
ii zf
1
)( > ∑
=
H
i
ii zf
1
* )( . Let I+ = {i/ t*i + fi(zi) > t*i + fi(z*i) }. 
Clearly I+ is non-empty. If I+ = I, then it is possible to find λ > λ* such that λ∈I, 
contradicting the maximality of λ*. Thus I \ I+ is non-empty. 
Since ∑
=
H
i
ii zf
1
)( > ∑
=
H
i
ii zf
1
* )(  it must be the case that )]()([ *ii
Ii
ii zfzf∑
+∈
−  > 
)]()([
\
* ii
IIi
ii zfzf∑
+∈
− .  
Thus for i∈I+ there exists εi > 0 and for i∈I\I+ there exists δi ≥ 0 such that ∑
+∈Ii
iε = 
∑
+∈ IIi
i
\
δ , fi(zi) -εi > fi(z*i) for i∈I+ and fi(zi) + δi > fi(z*i) for i∈I\I+. 
Indeed, let ε > 0 be such that )]()([
\
* ii
IIi
ii zfzf∑
+∈
− + ε < )]()([ *ii
Ii
ii zfzf∑
+∈
− . 
Let εi = 
∑
+∈
−
−
Ii
iiii
iiii
zfzf
zfzf
)]()([
)()(
*
*
( )]()([
\
* ii
IIi
ii zfzf∑
+∈
− + ε) for i∈I+ and δi = 
∑
+∈
−
−
IIi
iiii
iiii
zfzf
zfzf
\
*
*
)]()([
)()(
∑
+∈Ii
iε for i∈I\I+. It is easy to see that with these values of ε’s 
and δ’s the desired requirements are satisfied. 
Let t be a balanced vector of transfers such that ti = t*i-εi for i∈I+ and ti = t*i +δi for 
i∈I\I+.  
(z*, t) is feasible and there exists λ > λ* such that fi(w) ≥ ti + fi(z*i) ≥ λfi(w) for i = 
1,…,H. Once again maximality of λ* is contradicted. Thus (z*, t*) is efficient. Q.E.D. 
 
The following result shows that the egalitarian equivalent solution satisfies a much 
desirable equity concept known variously “fair-share guaranteed” or “indidual 
rationality from equal-share”. 
 
Proposition 4: Let (z*, t*) be an egalitarian equivalent solution. Then for all i = 
1,…,H: t*i + fi(z*i) ≥ 
H
1
 fi(w). 
 
Proof: Since for all i = 1,…,H the allocation where ‘i’ gets the entire initial 
endowment and no one gets anything else at all is feasible it is clear that V(w)≥ fi(w) 
for all i = 1,…,H. 
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Let (z*,t*) be an egalitarian equivalent solution and λ* the egalitarian equivalence 
factor. We need to show that λ* ≥ 
H
1
. 
Towards a contradiction suppose that λ* < 
H
1
. Thus, for all i= 1,…,H: t*i + fi(z*i) < 
H
1 fi(w). Summing over i and appealing to Proposition 3, we get by the efficiency of 
(z*, t*) that V(w) < ∑
=
H
i
i wf
H 1
)(1 ≤ V(w). The last inequality follows from the fact that 
V(w)≥ fi(w) for all i = 1,…,H. However this leads to V(w) < V(w) which is not 
possible. Hence λ* ≥ 
H
1
. Q.E.D. 
A feasible allocation (z,t) is said to be fair-share guaranteed if for all i = 1,…,H: ti + 
fi(zi) ≥ 
H
1
 fi(w). 
If a feasible allocation is fair-share guaranteed then each agent gets at least what she 
would be getting if her willingness to pay for the entire initial endowment was 
divided equally among all the agents. In a sense each agent is assured an equal share 
of the entire endowment viewed from her perspective.  
 
Note: If (P, (z*, t*)) is a Non-linear Market equilibrium from Equal Incomes and z* is 
an efficient non-monetary allocation then (z*, t*) is fair-share guaranteed. The 
reasoning behind this observation is as follows. Since (P, (z*, t*)) is a NMEEI, z* is an 
efficient non-monetary allocation (i.e. V(w) = ∑
=
H
i
ii zf
1
* )( ) and for all i = 1,…,H: 
(i) fi(z*i) – P(z*i) ≥ fi(x) – P(x) for all x∈C(w); 
(ii) t*i = 
H
zP
H
k
k
∑
=1
* )(
- P(z*i). 
Thus for all i, k = 1,…,H: fi(z*i) – P(z*i) ≥ fi(z*k) – P(z*k). Keeping i fixed and 
summing over k, we get H[fi (z*i) –P(z*i)] ≥ V(w) - ∑
=
H
k
kzP
1
* )( .  However, as observed 
in the proof of Proposition 4, V(w) ≥ fi(w). Thus, H[fi (z*i) –P(z*i)] ≥ fi(w) - 
∑
=
H
k
kzP
1
* )( .
  Dividing this inequality though out by H and using the fact that t*i = 
H
zP
H
k
k
∑
=1
* )(
- P(z*i), we get fi(z*i) + t*i ≥ 
H
1 fi(w), as was desired.  
This observation should be contrasted with the one available in Bevia (1998) which 
says that envy-free solutions may not be included in the set of “Identical Preferences 
Lower Bound solution” where the latter property is meant to convey a similar idea to 
what the fair-share guaranteed property does in our paper. 
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